The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 66 | Number 4

Article 8

11-1-1999

In Vitro Fertilization: Truth and Consequences
Mark Yavarone

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Medicine and Health Sciences
Commons
Recommended Citation
Yavarone, Mark (1999) "In Vitro Fertilization: Truth and Consequences," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 66: No. 4, Article 8.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol66/iss4/8

In Vitro Fertilization:
Truth and Consequences
by
Mark Yavarone, OMV

The author received a doctorate in Cell Biology and Anatomy at the
University of North Carolina and then began work on a Master 's
Degree in Moral Theology at St. John's Seminary in Boston.

In 1978 th e birth of Loui se Brown, the world ' s first test-tube baby,
ca ptured world wide attention. Over the past 20 years, the use of in vitro
fertili zati on ( IY F) has increased rapidl y. By 1994, approx imately 3 1,000
babies had been born in th e United States after fertili zation in vitro . 1
Thi s paper begins with a descripti on of IYF as it is practiced today.
The Church' s teac hin g on IY F is th en bri efl y rev iewed, followed by an
overview of argum ents used to support IYF . A fin al secti on examines
some o f th e untoward co nsequences of IYF whi ch are often ignored by its
proponents.
The Procedure

IY F norm all y begin s with hyperstimulati on of th e ovari es of an
inferti Ie woman (o r an egg donor) by a se ri es of dru g and horm one
inj ecti ons to mature multiple eggs within her ovary. ;\t th e end of thi s
peri od, the eggs are harvested, usually by inserti on of a hollow needle
th ro ugh the vaginal wall to th e ovary. Nati onwide, th e ave rage number of
eggs retri eved is about 12 per cyc le.2
The sperm for IY F are usuall y obtained fro m the wo man' s partner or
a sperm donor by masturbati on and th en ca pac itated for fertili zati on.
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Sperm and eggs are pl aced togeth e r in a c ulture medium to achi eve
fe rtili zati on, a nd the res ultin g e mb ryos a re g rown fo r abo ut 40 ho urs pri o r
to trans fera l to the woma n's ute ru s.
In cases o f ma le infe rtility, th e s pe rm may need some he lp to
pe netrate th e egg. O ne way of c irc umve ntin g thi s diffi c ulty is to modify
the zo na pe llu c ida o r parti a lly di ssecting it. A second so luti o n is intracytopl as mic sperm inj ecti o n ( ICS I). In ICS I, pe netrat io n of th e egg by the
sperm is simply bypassed ; a s in g le s perm is d irectly inj ected into th e
inte ri o r of th e egg. As in o th er in vitro meth ods, embryos are c ultured
bri e fl y pri o r to re in sert io n.
After th e culture pe ri od, embryos a re g raded based o n th e ir sha pe a nd
how we ll the ir ce ll s a re di vid ing. To inc rease the c hances of a s uccess ful
pregna ncy, a bo ut fo ur of th e hea lthi est e mbryos a re trans ferred to the
ute ru s o f the bi o logica l moth e r o r s urrogate. A study o f 267 IV F program s
in th e US and Canada revea led a c linical pregna ncy rate of 19. 8% pe r
cyc le, w ith a de livery rate o f 16 .0% per cycl e. ' A Be lg ian gro up ha s
re ported comparabl e rates of s uccess fo r ICS I. 4

Church Teaching on IYF and Related Procedures
Funda menta l to a ny unde rsta nd ing of th e Cath o lic C hurch' s teaching
o n IV F is th at procreati o n is exact ly th at: p ro-creation . T he transmi ss io n
of life is a n area in w hi ch ma n cooperates w ith God in the c reati o n o f new
life; it is no t a n area o ve r w hi c h God has g iven ma n unlimited do mini o n.
T he di gn ity o f procrea ti o n li es in th e fact th at man coope rates w ith God in
God 's c reati o n of a new hum an be in g, fo r w ho m God w ill s ete rn a l life.
" Huma n proc reati o n requires o n th e pa rt of th c spo uses respo nsibl e
co ll a bo rati o n w ith the fruit ful love of God. ")
Such co ll aborati o n in vo lves respect fo r th e na ture of the co nju ga l act
as God has auth ored it. Pope Pa ul V I" s encyc l ica l Humanae Vitae rema in s
the key source fo r unde rsta nd in g th e nature of thi s act. T hi s e ncyc lica l
po ints o ut the " in sepa rabl e conn ecti o n, w ill ed by God and un abl e to be
bro ke n by ma n o n hi s ow n initi ati ve, between th e two meanin gs of th e
6
co njuga l act: th e uniti ve mea nin g a nd th e procreati ve meanin g .. ·
O f itse lf, thi s state ment is not quitc s uffi c ient to establi sh th e
imm o ra li ty o f IV F. Fo r o ne co uld a rg ue, as does William Da ni e l. S.J. , that
a ll we lea rn from Humanae Vi/(le is th at whe n the co nju ga l uni o n is
prese nt, it mu st be bo th uniti ve a nd o rd ered to procreati o n. In th e case of
IV F, howeve r, the re is no act of conjuga l un ion , and thu s, it co uld be
7
a rg ued, no questi o n of sepa ratin g its two meanings .
To clari fy matters, it is necessary to read Humanae Vitae togethe r
w ith Doman Vitae, th e 1988 doc ume nt fro m th e Sac red Congregati o n fo r
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the Doctrine of the Faith whi ch addre sed IY F directly. In this statement,
the Congregation states that not only are the proc reati ve and unitive
meanings of the conjuga l act inse parable, but proc reati on is inseparable
from the conjuga l act. Conception in vitro is immoral because it is "the
result of tec hnical action whi ch pres ides ove r fertilizati on.
Such
fertili zati on is neither in fact ac hi eved nor positively willed as the
ex press ion and fruit of a specific ac t of conju ga l uni on."g This statement
points to the bas ic reason why IY F is wro ng. It replaces the conjugal act,
th e only proper context for proc reati on, with a techni ca l procedure. Thus,
of its nature, IYF differs from oth er tec hniques which assist fertili zati on.
Donum Vitae ex plicitly makes thi s di stinction: " If the technical means
fac ilitates th e conju gal act or helps it to reac h its natural objecti ves, it can
be mora lly acceptable. If, on the oth er hand. th e procedure were to replace
the conjugal act, it is morall y illici t: '!)
In isolatin g procreati on from co njugal uni on, IY F transfers the
ca usa lity of co nception to the hands of tec hnicians. Thi s di storts not only
th e pro per ro le of sex uality but al so th e pro per ro le of the phys ician, who is
then in vested with power over life and death. "The doctor is at th e service
of perso ns and of human proc reati on. He does not have th e authority to
di spose of th em and to dec ide their fa te:" o
Dvnum Vitae has more strong words fo r th e process of hetero logo us
artifi c ial fertili zati on, in which emb ryos are conce ived by th e use of
ga metes from at least one perso n oth er th an th e spouses: "The fid elity of
th e spouses in th e uni ty of marri age in vo lves rec iprocal respect of th eir
ri ght to beco me a fath er and a moth er onl y th ro ugh each oth er.'· " The
Congregati on in sists that hetero logo us art ific ial ferti Iizati on is detrimental
to the child, who "can di scove r hi s ow n identity and ac hi eve hi s own proper
human deve lopment : onl y th rough a "sec ure and recogni zed relati onship to
hi s own parents.,, 12
Cataldo outlin es two currents of contemporary thought which
dominate cultural views of IYF : perso nal autonomy and emotiv ism. He
li sts seve ral ethi ca l think tanks whi ch ap pea l primar ily to the princ iple of
autonomy in makin g mora l determin ati ons about reprodu cti ve techn ologies,
inc ludin g th e Ca nadi an Roya l Co mmi ss ion on New Reproducti ve
Tec hn o logies, Thc Dani sh Co un cil on Ethi cs. the U.S. Congress O ffice of
Tec hn o logy Assess ment, and the Ameri ca n Fertility Soc iety. Acco rdin g to
th e perso nal autonomy mind set, one is free to make hi s or her ow n ethi cal
determin ati on of th ese procedures and to use whateve r see ms appropriate.
Any norm s th at wo uld di sco unt reprod ucti ve tec hno logies place a limit on
pe rso na I freed 0 m.
T he oth er strai n of co ntempora ry th ought hi ghli ghted by Cata ldo is
emoti vism. A good example of an emoti vist presentati on of IYF is a maj or
Nove mber, 1999
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periodical ' s recent account of the birth of quadruplets to a 48 year-old
woman using her 28 year-old sister's donated egg cells. The overjoyed
mother views the future of the quads optimistically: "They' re going to grow
up in a caring environment with two parents who love them, not to mention
one wonderful aunt." I) Not surprisingly, no mention is made of any
arguments against IYF, nor the ambiguity of which woman is the loving
mother and which is the wonderful aunt.
More serious argumentation in favor of IVF from within the field of
moral theology goes beyond personal autonomy and emotivism. Any case
made in favor of IVF must accomplish two things: I) it must disavow the
necessary connection between procreation and the conjugal act; and 2) it
must provide a rationale for creating and destroying the "spare" embryos
that IVF requires for success.
Some theologians attempt to accomplish the first of these aims by
reference to the principle of totality. They admit that there must be some
connection between procreation and marital union, but deny that each and
every instance of procreation mu st take place within the context of a
conjugal act.
For example, Li sa Cahill remarks, " In homologous
techniques, the physical relationship of sexual intimacy, and the biological
relationship of parenthood are both preserved within the marital relation of
the couple.,,14 Cahill shares the mistake of some defenders of the
"fundamental option" theory by assuming that an association between the
conjugal act and procreation can exist on a transcendental level, i.e., on the
level of "relationship" rather than particular acts. On the contrary, actions
speak louder than words . Any recognition by the couple of the link
between conjugal union and procreation must be spoken with actions that
do not separate the two.
Objective #2 above is usually accompli shed by questioning the
personhood of the early embryo . Currently, such arguments use certain
fact s of developmental biology ill an effort to show that a newly conceived
human zygote is not, or is probably not, suitable material for a principle of
personhood, i.e., a soul. Among theologians who hold this position are
Norman Ford,15 Thomas Shannon, III and Richard McCormick.17
How do these theologians assail the personhood of the early embryo?
One way is by questioning the early embryo ' s individuality. According to
these authors, the early embryo is in some ways more like a collection of
cell s than an individual human being. This is evidenced by the fact that
each of the cells of the early embryo is totipotent, or able to develop into a
new embryo if it becomes separated from the rest of the cell mass. Such
separation occurs naturall y ill at least one-fourth of one percent of
pregnancies, resulting in multiple births. I S
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Because of the questionable stability of the early embryo, Ford,
Shannon, and McCormick draw a distinction between the kind of
individuality that the early embryo possesses and the sort possessed by the
later embryo or adult. According to McCormick, the zygote possesses
"genetic individuality" from fertilization . In other words, it contains a
unique genetic code different from each parent and from anyone else who
has ever existed . However, as long as the embryo's cells are totipotent, it
has not yet attained " developmental individuality," i.e., it is not yet
determined to produce one and only one human being. 19
Is developmental
individuality necessary for personhood?
McConnick answers affirmatively, because incommunicability is a defining
note of personhood. If a single embryo is capable of developing into twins,
how can the original embryo be held to possess an incommunicable
principle of personhood, i.e., a soul?
Such arguments against the personhood of the embryo are far from
unassailable. The movement from the premise that the early embryo can
twin to the conclusion that the embryo cannot be a person is rather swift.
Ashley suggests an alternative scenario by which an embryo that gives rise
to twins could nonetheless be a person: the newly-formed twin receives a
soul upon separation from the embryo.2o Moraczewski suggests as less
likely another hypothesis: the original zygote effectively dies, giving rise to
two new individuals. 21
The position of McCormick, Shannon. and others can also be
critiqued on the level of biology. There are many cases in nature in which
one individual of a species divides to form two individuals, yet no one
seriously denies that the original individual was fully an individual. Also,
if the embryo is really a collection of cells lacking stability, what accounts
for the fact that twinning does not occur 99% of the time?
In the end, scientific data are necessary but not sufficient to answer
the question of the early embryo ' s personhood. Certainty regarding the
personal dignity of the early embryo can be derived only from the
awareness that " the gift of truth" has been entrusted to the teaching Church.
However, the foregoing should be sufficient to illustrate that the
personhood of the early embryo is rationally defensible despite current
claims to the contrary.

Some Odd Consequences
Part of the difficulty involved in driving home the immorality of IYF
involves the consequentialist climate in which moral decisions are often
made. As a previously cited example illustrates, the popular media often
depicts happy outcomes of IYF without reference to its bad consequences,
November, 1999
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leaving many wondering what harm there could possi bly be in the
procedure. Without capitulating to consequential ism, it is worthwhile to
examine some of these harmful effects, since bad effects are always the
fruit of bad actions. What are some consequences of IYF other than those
usually mentioned?
The first to be considered is the killing and miscarriage of "spare"
embryos. Typically, technicians attempt to fertilize 12 eggs and implant
four of them. Other viable embryos are then frozen , killed , or used for
research. As an example, M.M . Bodin relates that after hyperstimulation of
her ovaries, an infertility clinic harvested 15 eggs. Upon fertilization in
vitro with her husband ' s sperm, doctors informed her that they had
produced II viable embryos. They transferred six of the embryos to
Bodin ' s uterus and froze the other five , but all six of the transferred
embryos died. The five frozen embryos were then thawed for a second
attempt, but only two of these survived the thawing process and these also
failed to implant.
Two years later Bodin made another attempt at IYF. This try was
"successful" and she gave birth nine months later. Technicians also froze
18 spare embryos from this attempt. Approximately one year later she felt
ready for another pregnancy, so she had 12 of these 18 embryos thawed .
Six were killed during the thawing process, and doctors transferred the
other six to her womb, resulting in the birth oftwins. 22
Thus, in giving birth to her three children, the " side effect" was 21
dead embryos, not counting the six that are still frozen , and any others that
never made it out of the petri dish.
As Donum Vitae remarks, "From the moment of conception the life of
every human being is to be respected in an absolute way." Descriptions
such as Bodin ' s make it clear that far from being respected absolutely, the
embryos produced by IYF are valued only as a pool from which desirable
candidates for reinsertion will be se lected . And the phenomenon of spare
embryos is not likely to go away, since each attempt at IYF is physically
and emotionally trying for the woman, as well as expensive.
As might be expected, the killing of spare embryos is not taken
seriously in descriptions of IYF. A recent Time magazine photo caption is
typical: "Doctors have countered a virtual epidemic of infertility with new
treatments, including the injection of sperm into eggs . .. The result: healthy
fetuses like the four-month old one at left - and thousands of proud
parents. ,,23
That all of this has resu lted in a general cheapening of human life is
not surprising either. Those who use IYF seem unable to recognize any
inherent values in their embryos outside of the trouble they have gone
through to have them created. As one IYF client ponders the fate of her six
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frozen frozen embryos, she remarks, " After all we ' ve gone through , the
concept of destroyi ng the e mbryos is hard to imagine. So we pay our $50 a
month storage fee, raise o ur boys a nd wonder what we are going to dO.,,24
With heterologous artificial fertilization , additional problems can
appear. A good example is Jaycee Buzzanca, a Ca lifornia two-year old
who wa s legally parentless, despite th e fact that six different peopl e could
reasonably claim to be her pare nts. In 1994, John and Luanne Buzza nca
arranged for IVF with anonymous spe rm and egg donors. The embryo was
implanted in the womb of a marri ed surrogate mother. Shortly before
Jaycee was bo rn , John Buzza nca fil ed for divorce. In the meantime, the
surrogate mother decided to see k custody of the child, but later withdrew
her claim. It is difficult to imagine a clearer example of the ignorance of
Donum Vitae's warning: " The child is not an object to which one has a
right, nor ca n he be considered as an object of ownership: rather, a child is
a g ift.,,25
In s uch cases of heterologo us artificial fertili zat io n, the eugenic nature
of IYF is seen eve n mo re clearly. To facilitate egg donation, egg banks
prov ide files o n prospecti ve donors, potential rec ipi e nts can se lect the o ne
who appears most like ly to y ie ld hea lthy, attractive, and othe rw ise desirable
offsprin g. Donors with more des ira bl e traits can receive a highe r fee for
their eggs.
Bad effec ts o n pare nts a re a lso be ing not iced . Jean Benward, a
psyc holog ist who spec iali zes in infe rtility cou nse ling, no tes that pa rents a re
ofte n di stressed w he n they see th e features of a nothe r woman o n the ir
baby ' s face. So me di scover that they think abo ut th e egg donor lo ng after
the baby arrives. Others, says Benward, are haunted by fanta s ies a bo ut
their Own biological offsp rin g th at w ill neve r be born. Gi na Grammatico, a
23 yea r-o ld egg donor, re ma rk s, "I didn ' t kn ow w hat I was getti ng into.
Ju st wondering what th e child loo ks like is go in g to bug me for the rest of
my life. ,,26 T hese diffi c ulti es may be mo re co mm o n than many rea li ze: in
1994, 1,240 bab ies were bo rn from donated eggs in the US alone. 27 And if
the a dults w ho opt for these procedures a re e nco untering untowa rd
conseque nces, what w ill the futures o f th e ir c hildre n ho ld ?

Conclusion
At present, there is littl e indi cati o n that the tide of reproduct ive
ma nipUlati o n wi ll be stemmed . In a ne w proced ure, e igh t births have now
been reported after fertilization of prev io us ly frozen eggs (as opposed to
th e frozen embrvos no rmall y used in IVf) . If thi s tec hn o logy is pe rfected
( perhap s in a decade o r so), yo un g wo me n will be ab le to have their eggs
re moved a nd frozen, pursue a ca reer, a nd then ha ve a c hild at w hatever age
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they decide to fit it into their schedule. Menopause will no longer mean the
end of childbearing. In fact, with standard egg donation, approximately
100 women over age 50 have already given birth, including a 63 year-old
American woman and a 62 year-old Italian. 28 As John Paris, S.1., remarks
in regard to these post-menopausal births, "We're designing orphans by
choice, and we say this is O.K.,,29
Of course, the immorality of IVF does not derive solely or even
primarily from such consequences. IVF usurps God ' s authority over the
creation of human life by removing it from the context of the conjugal act.
However, the growing circus of reproductive technologies should serve as a
reminder of what human beings find it rather difficult to learn : when we
ignore divine wisdom, we do so to our own peril.
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